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CONDITIONS FOR VOTING EQUILIBRIA
IN CONTINUOUS VOTER DISTRIBUTIONS*
RICHARD D. McKELVEY, PETER C. ORDESHOOK$ AND PETER UNGAR
Abstract. This paper extends Plott’s necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of majority rule
equilibria to the case where there is a continuous distribution of voters. Plott’s theorem extends in a natural
way to this setting: It is shown that a point, x*, is a majority rule equilibrium if and only if, for every
measurable cone originating at the origin, the measure of the voters whose gradients (at x*) lie in the cone is
equal to the measure of the voters whose gradients lie in the negative cone.
1. Introduction. Plott’s (1967) well-known necessary and sufficient conditions for
equilibrium in majority rule spatial voting games show that an equilibrium (or
Condorcet point) exists only under the most restrictive circumstances. Briefly, assuming
that (1) individual utility functions are differentiable, (2) the number of voters is finite,
and (3) at most one voter’s ideal point is located at the presumed equilibrium, Plott
establishes that a "local" equilibrium exists if and only if all voters (excluding any at the
equilibrium) can be paired in such a way that the contract curve of each pair passes
through the equilibrium. Equivalently, voters can be paired such that the utility
gradients of voters in each pair point in exactly opposite directions. Sloss (197 3) extends
this result to deal with nondifferentiable utility functions.
Here we focus on assumption (2) above and generalize Plott’s analysis to
continuous voter distributions. While empirical preference distributions are, of course,
discrete, a substantial literature models them as continuous. For example, Downs
(1957) and Tullock (1967) discuss, in very unformalized terms, the question of
equilibria for continuous voter distributions. More recent literature formalizes some of
these ideas, but assumes specific functional forms for individual utility, and generally
gives only sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria (see Davis, Hinich and
Ordeshook (1970), and Riker and Ordeshook (1973, Chaps. 11-12) for reviews of this
literature). These models assume individual preferences are a function of distance (not
necessarily Euclidean) from some ideal point, and the basic results are that a strong type
of symmetry in the distribution of ideal points is sufficient for the existence of equilibria.
Only when all preferences are a function of Euclidean distance have necessary and
sufficient conditions been found for the infinite voter model. The condition is the
existence of a total median in the distribution of ideal points (Davis, Degroot, and
Hinich (1972)).
The main result of this paper shows that Plott’s Theorem extends, in a natural way,
to the continuous voter case. The above results then follow directly from this extension
of Plott’s Theorem. Further, this theorem gives both necessary and sufficient conditions
for equilibria for more general types of utility functions than have heretofore been dealt
with in the continuous voter case. Also, we prove somewhat weaker sufficient condi-
tions than do either Plott or Sloss (although, since the equilibria considered here are
global rather than local, we impose a stronger assumption on the utility functions--
pseudoconcavity). Finally, we show, via several examples, that if assumption (3) is not
satisfied, Plott’s conditions, as well as our generalization of them, are no longer
necessary for equilibria.
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2. Definitions and assumptions. Let f denote a set of voters, and X a policy space.
Elements of are voters, denoted a,/3, etc., and elements ofX are alternatives, denoted
x, y, etc. Any subset of ll is a coalition, designated A, B, C, etc. Now, for each a fl, we
assume a utility function Us :X-> R. This yields a binary relation >_- X x X, as
follows: For any x, y X
(2.1) x_->y U(x)>-u(y).
Note that N is transitive and complete, for all a f. The derived relations > and
are defined in the usual manner. Further, for any coalition B
_
[2, we say B prefers x to
y, written x > B y :> x > y for all a B. Similarly, x NB y :> x >’ y for all a e B.
In general, the set I) may be either finite or infinite, but we assume that there is a
finite measure,/x, on a o- algebra of sets, .B in fl, so that for any B s .B,/x (B) represents
the size of the coalition B. Since/x is a finite measure, we set/x (fl) N. We also assume
that for any x, y X, that {a fl Ix y} ./3. If fl is finite,/x (B) is the counting measure,
and corresponds to the number of voters in B. Using the shorthand /x[x > y]=
/x {a efl Ix > y}, the plurality preference relation over X, >’, is then
x>=y [x>y]_->[y>x].
This relation, in turn, defines a Condorcet point:
DEFINITION 2.1. X S is a Condorcet point :> x ->" y for all y S.
Of course, a Condorcet point may not in general exist. An important definition in
establishing conditions for existence is the following:
DEFINITION 2.2. For any a, /3 f, the contract set C(a, 3), is the set C(a,/3)
{x X[ for all y X, y > x ==), x >- t Y and y > t x ==), x > y}.
In the usual terminology, C(a, ) corresponds to the set of points that are Pareto
optimal for a and/3. See e.g., McKelvey and Wendell (1976). We now state a sufficient
condition for a point to be a Condorcet point.
THEOREM 1. A sufficient condition for a point x* X to be a Condorcet point is that
there exists some measure preserving transformation T: 1
-
f such that
x* fq C(a, Ta).
Proof. Let x* and T satisfy the conditions of the theorem. We must show that, for
all xsX, tz[x*>x]>-lz[x>,x*]. Let B={alx>x*} and let A=T(B)=
{Ta Is B}. Since B .B and T is measure preserving, A .B and/x (A) =/x (B). Further
since x* C(a, Ta) for any a B, it follows that
x}. Hence/x[x* > x]=>/z[A] tz[B] =/x[x > x*] and it follows that x* =>x. So x* isa
Condorcet point. Q.E.D.
3. Necessary conditions. Note that the sufficiency condition requires no assump-
tions on the nature of individual utility functions nor even on the topological structure
of X. To formulate necessary conditions, we consider only the case where X
_
n, with
X open and convex. Further, we concern ourselves only with the case when global
characteristics of the space, such as contract sets and Condorcet points, can be described
in terms of local properties of individual utility functions. Pseudoconcavity of individual
utility functions is enough to guarantee this equivalence. We develop this in more detail.
If Us is differentiable, we let V Us (x) represent the gradient vector at the point
x X. The function Us is said to be pseudoconcave if it is differentiable and, for each
x* X,
(3.1) vu (x*)(x x*) <- o u (x) <- u (x*)
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for all x X. See, e.g., Mangasarian (1969) for properties of pseudoconcave functions.
In particular, any pseudoconcave function is also strictly quasiconcave (Mangasarian,
(1969, p. 143)). That is, for any x, y X, and 0 < A < 1,
(3.2) U(x)< U(y) =), U(x)< U,(hx+(1-h)y).
Further, if all U are pseudoconcave, then for any x X, y ", it follows that sets of
the form {a IVU (x). y > 0}, {a 17U (x). y 0}, {a [U (x). y, 0}, etc., are measur-
able. To see this, note, by pseudoconcavity,
(3.3) {[vg(x).y>0}= n x+-y > x
i=io
where io is chosen so that x + (1/io) y X.
By assumption, the sets on the right-hand side are measurable, hence the set on the
left-hand side is also measurable. Next, we can write {[VU(x). y0}=
(-y)>0} and {[VU(x). y=0}={[VU(x), y e0}{lVU(x)
(-y)N 0} to establish that sets of these forms are measurable.
Now if U and U are both pseudoconcave with unique maxima,
(3.4) x C(, ) kVU(x) -lVUo(x)
for some k 0, 10, not both zero (c.f., McKelvey and Wendell (1976)). So the
contract set can be described in terms of local properties of the U. Similarly, a local
characterization of Condorcet points can be given in terms of a "Plott equilibrium""
DEFINITION 3.1. If all U are differentiable, a point x* eX is a Plott equilibrium if
for all y e ", {[y. u= > 0} N N/2 where u V U(x*). Equivalently, this can be
written {a [y u > 0} N { ly u= 0} for all y ".
The equivalence of a Plott equilibrium and a Condorcet point is not assured,
however, for general measures on (even if all U are pseudoconcave). The following
example given by Sloss (1973), serves as a counterexample to this equivalence" Let
X=R n={1, 2.., .}, and g (x)=-[lx-x ll where x=(0, 1/). Then, if the
measure on is the counting measure, but if is infinite, x* (0, 0) is a Condorcet
point. At x*, though, VU (x*) (0, 2/), so all voters prefer to move in the direction
(0, 1). This counterexample clearly rests on the assumption that the measure on is not
finite. If the measure is finite, we can establish the equivalence of a Condorcet point and
a Plott equilibrium. Thus, we have
LEMMA 1. Ifg is pseudoconcavefor all a e , and i[ is a finiw measure on , then
x* is a Condorcet point x* is a Plott equilibrium.
Pro@ Assume x* is a Condorcet point, but that it is not a Plott equilibrium. Then
for some y ", {a ]y u > 0} > N/2. (Here u VU (x*), as before.) Let C
{aly. u > 0}. Pick ioso that x*+(1/io) y6X. For iio, let
(3.5) A U x* + y > U(x*)
By assumption these sets are in the
-
algebra B. By differentiability of the U, it follows
for every a C there exists an integer i0 such that A. Further, by pseudocon-
cavity and (3.2), the A form an increasing nested sequence. So there exists a J such that
for i>Z (A)>N. Hence for these values of i, x*+(1/i)y>x*, contrary to the
assumption that x* is a Condorcet point.
Sloss (1973, Thrm. 4.4, p. 66) proves the converse, so the two equilibrium notions
are equivalent in the case of finite measure spaces and pseudoconcave utility
functions. Q.E.D.
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Before we prove the main theorem of this paper, we require an additional lemma
that is central to its proof. First, given a vector y n, we define"
Hr {x n [y’. x 0},
(3.6) Hy -{xly
H {x ly’" x < 0}.
Further,
(3.7)
and we let _B be the r-algebra generated by _H/. So sets in _B are cones with vertex at the
origin. Then we have
LEMMA 2. Let h be a finite measure on B" then if h (H- for all y
h (A) h (-A) for all A B.
Proof. This is proven by Overdijk, Simons and Steutel (1977).
Now, given x* X, the measure Ix generates a natural measure Ix*, on _B as follows.
For any y ", set
(3.8) /x*(H) tx{alVU,(x*)" y >0}
It follows, for any A _B, that
(3.9) /x*(A) =/x {a IV Us (x*) A}.
We now have the following theorem giving necessary and sufficient conditions for a
point to be a Condorcet point.
THEOREM 2. Assume all Us are pseudoconcave, i is a finite measure on f, and that
/x {a IV Us (x*) 0} 0. Then a necessary and sufficient condition ]:or x* to be a Condorcet
point is that
tz*(A) tx*(-A)
]:or all A B_
Proof. For any a e l write us V Us (x*). Then x* is a Condorcet point if and only if
for any x, tz {a Ix >" x*} -< ix {a Ix* > x}. But, by Lemma 1, this is true if and only if for all
x, tz{a I(x x*)’. u > 0} /.e{a I(x x*)’. us =< 0}. Equivalently, setting y x x*, we
have for all y, tx{a lY" us > 0} <-/x{a lY" us <= 0}. Using the notation defined above, it
follows that x* is a Condorcet point if and only if
(3.10) z*(H -< tz*(Hr H for all y.
We wish to show now that (3.10) is equivalent to
(3.11) tz*(H )=/x*(H-) for all y.
Obviously, (3.11) implies (3.10), so we must only show that (3.10) implies (3.11).
If {z}= is a sequence of vectors in "
such that any n vectors in the sequence are
linearly independent then for any e > 0 the inequality/x*(Hz,) > e holds for at most
This lemma was proved first by Peter Ungar, but we cite here Overdijk et al.’s proof since it is
considerably shorter than the original.
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finitely many i. To prove this, we let N be the natural numbers, and for any finite subset
S
_
, let [S[ be the number of elements in S. For all i,/" , define Hi Hz,, and
(3.12) H, {x H,I I{k NIk -<- 1 and x H}I j}.
Then, by construction, for all , Hi is partitioned by {Hi/.}/.= 1. But by assumption, for
any nonzero vector x, at most n 1 vectors Zk satisfy x zk 0. That is, x is in at most
n--1
n- 1 different H. So H/. b for j _-> n, and/-//is actually partitioned by {H/.}/.=. In
particular, this implies, for all
(3.13)
/.=1
Further, for any j , H0. and
U/= H,
___
is a disjoint union. So
K
(3.14) Y’. tx* (/-/.) <_- x*(n) N.
i=1
Now, using (3.13) and (3.14), for any K 3; we have
K K n-1 n-1 K
/x*(H) 2 *(H0’)= Y’. Y /x*(H0.)
i=1 i-1 /’=1 /.=1 i=1
(3.15) -<_ N (n 1)N.
/.=1
That is
(3.16) E /z*(H/) _-< (n 1)N.
i=1
From this, it follows that/x * (Hz,) > e can hold for at most finitely many i, as we wished to
show. Thus, if vl, v2,’" is a sequence of vectors such that any n are linearly
independent then/x*(Hv,) 0 and consequently, from (3.10)
(3.17) /x*(H,) --> 1/2N.
Now, introduce coordinates so that y =(1, 0,..., 0). Let v (1, v12," , Vln),
v2 (1, v22, v23, , v2n)," be a sequence of vectors such that
(i) limVg’/.+=0 for j=l, 2,...,n-1;
(3.18) (ii) vi/. > 0 for all i, j;
(iii) any n of the vectors vi are linearly independent.
To satisfy condition (iii) vi must not be in any one of the 1Cn 1 planes spanned
by n 1-tuples of previously selected vectors. Clearly there is no difficulty in construc-
ting a sequence which satisfies (i), (ii) and this additional restriction.
The sets/-/v+, converge pointwise to H- U P, where P is the set of vectors which
belong to Hy (i.e., have 0 first component) and whose first non-zero component is
positive. It follows by Egoroff’s Theorem (see Kingman and Taylor (1966, Thrm. 7.1,
also Thrm. 7.2)) that the H+ +, converge in measure to Hy U P. So, using (3.17)
(3.19) /z * (n-) +/x * (P) lim/x *(n+, 1/2N.
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Applying the same argument with the sequence W (--1, /)i2, ", l-)in) we get
(3.20) t*(H- )+/x*(P) 1/2N.
The relation (3.11) is a consequence of the last two equations.
We can now apply Lemma 2 to conclude that (3.10) holds if and only if
(3.21) /x*(a) =/x*(-a)
for all A _B. Hence x* is a Condorcet point if and only if (3.21) holds, as claimed in the
theorem. Q.E.D.
4. Implications. Plott’s theorem shows that in the finite voter case, if there is no
more than one voter with ideal point at the point x*, necessary and sufficient conditions
for x* to be a (local) Condorcet point are that it is possible to pair all voters such that if
voters c and/3 are paired, then
vu (x*)= -kVU(x*)
for some k > 0. Thus there must be perfect symmetry around the origin of the vectors
VU(x*)" For every gradient vector pointing in one direction there is another pointing
in exactly the opposite direction.
Theorem 2 of the previous section is a natural extension of Plott’s Theorem to the
continuous voter case. The theorem says that x* is a Condorcet point if and only if for
every cone, A _B, the measure (or proportion) of the voters with gradients in A must be
exactly the same as the measure of the voters with gradients in -A. Note that if the set,
f, of voters is finite, and t is the counting measure, then Theorem 2 reduces to Plott’s
Theorem if we only consider sets, A, which are rays from the origin. The severity of the
above conditions indicates that, as in the finite voter models, existence of equilibria in
the continuous voter model would be a rare event.
Theorem 2 can be illustrated by a particular, but widely studied class of models
namely, the several extensions of the so called "Downsian" model of two party
competition. In their simplest form, these models assume that for all voters, U is a
function of Euclidean distance. Thus, for all a f, there is a x Yt n, such that
(4.1) Us(x)
-IIx -xl[.
The vector x is called voter a’s ideal point. In this case, it follows that, for x* e,
(4.2) VU(x*)= -2(x* x).
So, if A 6 _B, then
(4.3) VU,(x*)A :> x-x* cA x, 6x* +A.
Now Davis, Degroot and Hinich [1972] show that a necessary and sufficient
condition for x* to be a Condorcet point is that x* be a total median of the distribution
of the vectors x. Note that this follows from Theorem 2 and equation (4.3) by
considering sets, A, which are half spaces of the form H-. Davis, Degroot and Hinich
then proceed to give conditions on the distribution of the x which are sufficient for x*
to be a total median. These conditions are that the distribution of x is symmetric about
x* in the following sense" For every Borel set A,
(4.4) /z {ce Ix x* +A} tz {c Ix 6 x* a}.
From Theorem 2, of course, we see that this condition is stronger than need be. The
condition is sufficient, but not necessary for x* to be a Condorcet point. Necessary and
sufficient conditions require only that (4.4) holds for A e _B. It follows, that for this
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simple model, equilibrium exists if and only if the distribution of ideal points is "weakly
symmetric" about some point--the presumed equilibrium. Here, weak symmetry
means that for any cone, say A, the proportion of voters with ideal points in the cone
x* +A equals the proportion with ideal points in the cone x*-A.
It is important to emphasize, nevertheless, the importance of Plott’s third pre-
condition and the corresponding condition of our theorem that the set of voters with
ideal points at x* is of measure zero. It is straightforward to show, that if these
conditions do not hold in their respective finite and continuous population cases,
neither our theorem nor Plott’s analysis establishes necessity. Suppose that Us is given
by simple Euclidean distances. In Fig. 1, with two voter’s ideal points at x*, x* is a
Condorcet point. Nevertheless, weak symmetry of the ideal points does not hold.
Similarly, in Fig. 2, we suppose that voter ideal points are uniformly distributed over a
Voter 3
Voter
Voters
4,5
Voter 2
FIG.
Area A
h// T.otal a2ea in
FIG. 2
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circle of unit area with measure 1. The point x* is a Condorcet point if we "pile up"
additional voters with measure 2A at x*. Again, then, an equilibrium exists even
though weak symmetry does not hold.
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